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Abstract. We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with
selfish users. In a contention game each of n ≥ 2 identical players has a single information packet
that she wants to transmit using one of k ≥ 1 multiple-access channels. To do that, a player
chooses a slotted-time protocol that prescribes the probabilities with which at a given time-step
she will attempt transmission at each channel. If more than one players try to transmit over
the same channel (collision) then no transmission happens on that channel. Each player tries
to minimize her own expected latency, i.e. her expected time until successful transmission, by
choosing her protocol. The natural problem that arises in such a setting is, given n and k, to
provide the players with a common, anonymous protocol (if it exists) such that no one would
unilaterally deviate from it (equilibrium protocol).
All previous theoretical results on strategic contention resolution examine only the case of
a single channel and show that the equilibrium protocols depend on the feedback that the
communication system gives to the players. Here we present multi-channel equilibrium protocols
in two main feedback classes, namely acknowledgement-based and ternary. In particular, we
provide equilibrium characterizations for more than one channels, and give specific anonymous,
equilibrium protocols with finite and infinite expected latency. In the equilibrium protocols
with infinite expected latency, all players transmit successfully in optimal time, i.e. Θ(n/k),
with probability tending to 1 as n/k →∞.
Keywords: Contention resolution, Multiple channels, Acknowledgement-based protocol, Ternary
feedback, Game theory
1 Introduction and Motivation
In the last fifteen years a great number of works in the Electrical and Electronics Engineering
community has been devoted to designing medium access control (MAC) protocols that achieve
high throughput. Their main approach is to consider, instead of the initial single-channel scheme,
multi-channel schemes (multi-channel MAC protocols) which resolve contention caused by packet
collisions (e.g. [6,19,23–25,28]). Apart from high throughput, an additional benefit of introducing more
channels in such a system is robustness, meaning no great dependence on a single node’s functionality.
However, to the authors’ knowledge, strategic behaviour in multi-channel systems is limited to the
Aloha protocol ([18]), contrary to the case of single-channel systems (e.g. [2,7–9,11]). In this paper, we
examine the problem of strategic contention resolution in multi-channel systems, where obedience to a
suggested protocol is not required. We seek only anonymous, equilibrium protocols, that is, protocols
which do not use player IDs. If a player’s protocol depended on her ID, then equilibria are simple,
but can be unfair as well; scheduling each player’s transmission through a priority queue according to
her ID is an equilibrium.
We provide two types of equilibrium protocols. The first type, called FIN-EQ, describes an
anonymous, equilibrium protocol that yields finite expected time of successful transmission (latency)
to a player. Similarly, the second type, called IN-EQ, describes an anonymous, equilibrium protocol
which yields infinite expected latency to a player but is also efficient, i.e, all players transmit
successfully within Θ( #players#channels ) time with high probability. We study equilibria for two classes of
feedback protocols: (a) acknowledgement-based protocols, where the user gets just the information of
whether she had a successful transmission or not, only when she tries to transmit her packet, and (b)
? The work of this author was partially supported by the ERC Project ALGAME.
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protocols with ternary feedback, where the user is informed about the number of pending players in
each time-step regardless of whether she attempted transmission or not. Previous results on these
classes of protocols have been produced only for the case of a single transmission channel ([7,11]).
Here we investigate the multiple-channels case.
In the last part of the paper we seek efficient protocols for both feedback classes. Due to an
impossibility result that we show (Theorem 7), the technique used in [11] by Fiat et al. for the
single-channel setting in order to provide a FIN-EQ that is also efficient, cannot be applied when there
are more than one channels. This fact discourages us from searching for efficient FIN-EQ protocols
and, instead, points to the search for efficient IN-EQ protocols, which indeed we find. One could
argue that an anonymous protocol with infinite expected time until successful transmission, such as
the IN-EQ protocols we provide, does not incentivize a player to participate in such a communication
system. To this we reply that exponential waiting-time for a large amount of players (see protocol in
Subsection 4.2) is equally bad for a player, since waiting for e.g. e10 msec is like waiting forever in
Real-Time-Communications.
1.1 Our results
The main contributions of this work are the characterizations of FIN-EQ and IN-EQ protocols in
the two aforementioned feedback classes. Note that in the current bibliography regarding the single-
channel setting, there are no characterizations of equilibrium in acknowledgement-based protocols.
Also, in the single-channel setting the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with finite expected
latency in the class of acknowledgement-based protocols remains an open problem, even for three
players. However, for the settings with 2 and 3 transmission channels, we present simple anonymous
FIN-EQ protocols for up to 4 and 5 players respectively which appeared in [10]. Furthermore, these
protocols are memoryless, while the only known FIN-EQ protocol in the single-channel setting ([7]) is
not.
The paper is organized in three main parts. Section 3 deals with FIN-EQ protocols in the
acknowledgement-based feedback setting. In that section we give two characterizations of equilibrium
and also provide FIN-EQ protocols for specific numbers of players and channels. Section 4 deals
with FIN-EQ protocols in the ternary feedback setting and extends the corresponding results for the
single-channel setting by Fiat et al. [11]. Finally, in Section 5, IN-EQ protocols with deadline are
provided with the property that the time until all n players transmit successfully is Θ(n/k) with high
probability, when there are k channels. The latter result makes clear the advantage (with respect to
time efficiency) that multiple channels bring to a system with strategic users, which is that the time
until all players transmit successfully with high probability is inversely proportional to the number of
available channels.
1.2 Related work
Contention in telecommunications is a major problem that results to poor throughput due to packet
collisions. Motivated mainly by this problem, many works studying conflict-resolution protocols
emerged in the late 70’s ([4,5,14,22,27]). Their approach is to resolve a collision when it occurs, and
only then allow further transmissions on the channel. In those works the user’s packets are assumed
either to be generated by some stochastic process, or to appear at the same time in a worst-case
scenario. Here, we consider the latter setting, i.e. a worst-case model of slotted time, where at any
time-step all users have a packet ready to be transmitted (for an example of a similar bursty-input
case, see [3]). As stated in [12], even though real implementations of multiple-access channels do not
fit precisely within the slotted-time model, it can be shown (e.g. [13,16]) that results obtained in this
model do apply to realistic multiple-access channels.
Also, many works have examined multiple-channel communication protocols. In the data link layer,
a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol is responsible for the flow of data through a multiple-access
medium. Our multiple-channels model is motivated by theoretical and experimental results which have
shown that higher throughput and lower delay is achieved by using “multi-channel” MAC protocols
(see [19,20,24,25]). In [25],the multi-channel hidden terminal problem is raised which, additionally to
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increased packet collisions, results to incapability of the users to “sense” more than one channels at a
time (possibly none); therefore a user might not know whether another user transmitted successfully or
not (see also [26] for the classical “hidden terminal problem”). This motivates us for the consideration
of feedback protocols with minimum feedback, i.e. “acknowledgement-based” protocols (see par.2,
Section 1). Also, settings with stronger feedback have been studied (e.g. the Aloha protocol in [18])
in which a user is informed about the number of users that have not transmitted successfully yet.
This is why we consider “ternary feedback” protocols (see par.2, Section 1).
Apart from the latter, all of the aforementioned works assume that the users blindly follow the
given protocol, i.e. the users are not strategic. Contention resolution with strategic users has been
studied only in single-channel settings or in the special case of the multiple-channel Aloha protocol.
Some interesting cooperative and noncooperative models of slotted Aloha have been analysed in
[1,17,18]. Aiming to understand the properties of contention resolution under selfishness, apart from
various feedback settings, many cost functions have also been studied. One of the most meaningful
cost functions is the one that models non-zero transmission costs as in [9] (and also [2,18]).
The theoretical works that relate the most to the current paper are the seminal paper by
Fiat, Mansour and Nadav [11] and two by Christodoulou et al. [7,8] which study protocols for
strategic contention resolution with zero transmission costs. These works examine the case of a
single transmission channel only. In [11] the feedback is ternary. In that work, a characterization of
symmetric equilibrium is provided, along with an efficient FIN-EQ protocol that puts an extremely
costly equilibrium after a deadline in order to force users to be obedient. The feedback model of [7]
and [8] is the acknowledgement-based. Among other results, [7] provides the unique FIN-EQ protocol
for the case of two players and a deadline IN-EQ protocol for at least three players.
2 The Model and Definitions
Game structure. We define a contention game as follows. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players,
also denoted by [n], and K = {1, 2, . . . , k} the set of channels. Each player has a single packet that
she wants to send through a channel in K, without caring about the identity of the channel. All
players know n and K. We assume synchronous communications with discretized time, i.e. time
slots t = 1, 2, . . . . The players that have not yet successfully transmitted their packet are called
pending and initially all n players are pending. At any given time slot t, a pending player i has a set
A = {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} of pure strategies: a pure strategy a ∈ A is the action of choosing channel a ∈ K
to transmit her packet on, or no transmission (a = 0). At time t, a (mixed) strategy of a player i is a
probability distribution over A that potentially depends on information that i has gained from the
process based on previous transmission attempts. If exactly one player transmits on a channel in a
given slot t, then her transmission is successful, the successful player exits the game (i.e. she is no
longer pending), and the game continues with the rest of the players. On the other hand, whenever
two or more players try to access the same channel (i.e. transmit) at the same time slot, a collision
occurs and their transmissions fail, in which case the players remain in the game. The game continues
until all players have successfully transmitted their packets.
Transmission protocols. Let Xi,t ∈ A be the channel-indicator variable that keeps track of the
identity of the channel where player i attempted transmission at time t; value 0 indicates no
transmission attempt. For any t ≥ 1, we denote by #»Xt the transmission vector at time t, i.e.
#»
Xt = (X1,t, X2,t, . . . , Xn,t).
An acknowledgement-based protocol uses very limited channel feedback. After each time step t,
only players that attempted a transmission receive feedback, and the rest get no information. In fact,
the information received by a player i who transmitted during t is whether her transmission was
successful (in which case she gets an acknowledgement and exits the game) or whether there was a
collision.
In a protocol with ternary feedback every pending player in every round is informed about the
number of remaining players m ≤ n. This information is given to the players regardless of their
transmission history.
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Let
#»
h i,t be the vector of the personal transmission history of player i up to time t, i.e.
#»
h i,t =
(Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,t). We also denote by
#»
h t the transmission history of all players up to time t, i.e.
#»
h t = (
#»
h 1,t,
#»
h 2,t, . . .
#»
hn,t). A decision rule fi,t for a pending player i at time t, is a function that maps
#»
h i,t−1 to a strategy
#»
P i,t, with elements Pr(Xi,t = a| #»h i,t−1) for all a ∈ A. When the transmission
probability on some a′ ∈ A is not stated in a decision rule it is because it can be deduced from the
stated ones.
For a player i ∈ N , a (transmission) protocol fi is a sequence of decision rules fi = {fi,t}t≥1 =
fi,1, fi,2, . . . . Given a protocol fi for player i, when her decision rules depend on the number of
pending players and the personal history of i, then we describe them by the player’s probability
distribution on the action set A. In this case, we denote by pi,am,t the probability of player i choosing
action a at time t given her personal history ht−1 when m players are pending right before t. When
the context is clear enough we will drop some of the indices accordingly.
When we state that the players use an anonymous protocol f , we will mean that they follow a
common protocol f(= f1 = · · · = fn) whose decision rules do not depend on any ID of the player (in
our setting players do not have IDs), i.e. the decision rule assigns the same strategy to all players with
the same personal history. In particular, for any two players i 6= j and any t ≥ 0, if #»h i,t−1 = #»h j,t−1,
it holds that fi,t(
#»
h i,t−1) = fj,t(
#»
h j,t−1). In this case, we drop the subscript i in the notation and write
f instead of fi.
A protocol fi for player i is a deadline protocol with deadline t0 if and only if there exists a finite
t0 ≥ 1 such that a particular channel ai ∈ K is assigned (deterministically or stochastically) to player
i at some time t ≤ t0 and Pr(Xi,t = ai| #»h i,t−1) = 1 for every time slot t ≥ t0 and any history #»h i,t−1.
Efficiency. Assume that all n players follow an anonymous protocol f . We will call f efficient if and
only if all players will have successfully transmitted by time Θ(n/k) with high probability (i.e. with
probability tending to 1, as n→∞).
Individual utility. By protocol profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) we will call the n-tuple of the players’
protocols. For a given transmission sequence
#»
X1,
#»
X2, . . . , which is consistent with
#»
f , define the
latency of agent i as Ti , inf{t : Xi,t = a,Xj,t 6= a, for some a ∈ K,∀j 6= i}. That is, Ti is the time
at which i successfully transmits. Also, define the finishing time of
#»
f as T , supi{Ti}, i.e., the least
time at which all players have successfully transmitted. Given a transmission history
#»
h t, the n-tuple
of protocols
#»
f induces a probability distribution over sequences of further transmissions. In that case,
we write C
#»
f
i (
#»
h t) , E[Ti| #»h t, #»f ] = E[Ti| #»h i,t, #»f ] for the expected latency of a pending agent i given
that her current history is
#»
h i,t and from t+ 1 on she follows fi. For anonymous protocols, i.e. when
f1 = f2 = · · · = fn = f , we will simply write Cfi (
#»
h t) instead. Abusing notation slightly, we will also
write C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) for the unconditional expected latency of player i induced by
#»
f . We also define the
expected future latency F
#»
f
i (
#»
h t) , C
#»
f
i (
#»
h t)− t and again, whenever clear from the context, we omit
redundant indices or vectors from the notation.
Equilibria. The objective of every player is to minimize her expected latency. We call a protocol gi a
best response of player i to the partial protocol profile
#»
f −i if for any transmission history
#»
h t, player i
cannot decrease her expected latency by unilaterally deviating from gi after t. That is, for all time
slots t, and for all protocols f ′i for player i, we have
C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h t) ≤ C(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h t),
where (
#»
f −i, gi) (respectively, (
#»
f −i, f ′i)) denotes the protocol profile where every player j 6= i uses
protocol fj and player i uses protocol gi (respectively f
′
i). For an anonymous protocol f , we denote
by (f−i, gi) the profile where player j 6= i uses protocol f and player i uses protocol gi.
We say that
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) is an equilibrium if for any transmission history
#»
h t the players
cannot decrease their expected latency by unilaterally deviating after t; that is, for every player i, fi
is a best response to
#»
f −i.
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FIN-EQ and IN-EQ protocols. We call an anonymous protocol FIN-EQ if it is an equilibrium protocol
and yields finite expected latency to a player. Similarly, we call an anonymous protocol IN-EQ if it is
an equilibrium protocol, yields infinite expected latency to a player, and is also efficient.
3 Equilibrium for Acknowledgement-based Protocols
3.1 Nash equilibrium characterizations
The following equilibrium characterizations for the class of acknowledgement-based protocols help us
check whether the protocols we subsequently guess are equilibrium protocols. The characterizations
are for symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, arbitrary number of channels k ≥ 1 and number of
players n ≥ 2.
In an acknowledgement-based protocol, the actions of player i at time t depend only (a) on her
personal history
#»
h i,t−1 and (b) on whether she is pending or not at t. Let
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) be a
tuple of acknowledgement-based protocols (not necessarily anonymous) for the n players. For a (finite)
positive integer τ∗, and a given history hi,τ∗ = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗), define for player i the protocol
gi = gi(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = ai,t} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= ai,t} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
fi,t, for t > τ
∗.
(1)
A personal history
#»
h i,τ∗ is consistent with the protocol profile
#»
f if and only if there is a non-zero
probability that
#»
h i,τ∗ will occur for player i under
#»
f . Protocol gi(hi,τ∗) is consistent with
#»
f if and
only if hi,τ∗ is consistent with
#»
f , and when clear from the context we write gi instead. We denote
the set of all gi’s, that is, all gi(hi,t)’s for all t ≥ 1, which are consistent with #»f , by G
#»
f
i . If fi = f ∀i
(i.e. f is anonymous), then instead of gi and G
#»
f
i we write g and Gf respectively.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium characterization 1). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of acknowledgement-based protocols and a protocol
gi = gi(hi,τ∗) for some τ
∗ ≥ 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i)
#»
f is an equilibrium.
(ii) For every player i ∈ [n],
if gi ∈ G
#»
f
i then C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0).
Proof. To show that
#»
f being an equilibrium is a sufficient condition, we use the same argument as in
Lemma 4 of [7]. In particular, for a player i, due to the Tower Property we have,
C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) = E[Ti| #»h i,0, #»f ]
=
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
E[Ti| #»h i,0, ( #»f −i, gi(hi,τ∗))]Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}. (2)
For short, we will denote gi(hi,τ∗) by gi, thus we denote E[Ti| #»h i,0, ( #»f −i, gi(hi,τ∗))] by C(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0).
Then, suppose that
#»
f is an equilibrium and assume for the sake of contradiction that there
is a transmission history
#»
h i,τ∗ for player i such that C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) 6= C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0). Obviously, if
C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) < C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) this would mean that protocol gi(τ
∗) is better than fi, thus
#»
f is not
an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) > C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0), then from (2) there must exist
another transmission history
#»
h ′i,τ∗ such that C
(
#»
f −i,gi(
#»
h ′i,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0) < C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0). Therefore, we conclude
that C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) = C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) which also equals min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) by definition of the equilibrium,
for every transmission history
#»
h i,τ∗ that is consistent with
#»
f .
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To show that
#»
f being an equilibrium is also a necessary condition, assume that gi ∈ G
#»
f
i implies
C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0). Then, equality (2) becomes
C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0) =
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,gi(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
=
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
= min
f ′i
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0)
and thus
#»
f is by definition an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (Best response). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of acknowledgement-based
protocols. For a fixed protocol f ′i of player i ∈ [n] and some hi,τ∗ = (ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,τ∗) consistent
with (
#»
f −i, f ′i), define the following protocol.
ri = ri(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = ai,t} = 1, Pr{Xi,t 6= ai,t} = 0) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
f ′i,t, , for t > τ
∗.
(3)
If for player i there exists a finite τ∗ ≥ 1 such that C(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0) for every
hi,τ∗ , then C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) ≥ C(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0).
Proof. By definition of the expected latency (equation (2)) for a fixed τ∗ we have:
C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) =
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
≥
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i}
= C
(
#»
f −i,fi)
i (
#»
h 0).
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium characterization 2). Consider a profile
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . fn) of acknowledgement-based protocols. The following statements are equivalent:
(i)
#»
f is an equilibrium.
(ii) For every player i ∈ [n],{
(a) C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0) = C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0), ∀gi, ri ∈ G
#»
f
i , and
(b) C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) ≤ C(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0), ∀gi ∈ G
#»
f
i , ri /∈ G
#»
f
i .
Proof. Sufficiency of
#»
f being an equilibrium for condition (ii-a) comes directly from Lemma 1; for
condition (ii-b), for the sake of contradiction suppose
#»
f is an equilibrium and that there exist some
protocols gi ∈ G
#»
f
i and ri /∈ G
#»
f
i such that C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i (
#»
h 0) > C
(
#»
f −i,ri)
i (
#»
h 0). This means that ri is a
better protocol than fi, thus (
#»
f −i, fi) is not an equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
To prove necessity of
#»
f being an equilibrium under conditions (ii-a) and (ii-b), for the sake of
contradiction, suppose (ii-a) and (ii-b) hold and
#»
f is not an equilibrium. Then there must exist some
protocol f ′i such that C
(
#»
f −i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h 0) < C
#»
f
i (
#»
h 0). Using (2) the latter inequality can be written as∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,ri(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i} <
∑
#»
h i,τ∗
C
(
#»
f −i,gi(hi,τ∗ ))
i (
#»
h 0)Pr{ #»h i,τ∗ happens for i},
where gi(hi,τ∗) is consistent with
#»
f and ri(hi,τ∗) is consistent with (
#»
f −i, f ′i). Given the conditions
(ii-a) and (ii-b) the latter inequality is a contradiction.
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3.2 Acknowledgment-based FIN-EQ protocols
Regarding the search for FIN-EQ protocols, there is no straight-forward way for our equilibrium
characterizations (previous subsection) to be used in order to find an equilibrium protocol. However,
they allow us to check whether the protocols discussed in this subsection are equilibrium protocols.
In this subsection we give FIN-EQ protocols for k = 2 and k = 3.
We define the following anonymous, memoryless protocol for k ≥ 2 channels.
Protocol f k : For player i, every t ≥ 1 and any history #»h i,t−1,
fki,t =
(
Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0, Pr{Xi,t = a} = 1
k
, ∀a ∈ K
)
. (4)
n players - 2 transmission channels. Here, we first give an example of a method for checking
equilibria (Theorem 1). Then, with a better approach, by employing our characterizations of the
previous subsection, we prove that f2 is an equilibrium protocol for n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2
channels (Theorem 3).
Lemma 3. When all n ≥ 2 players use protocol f2 the expected latency of any player is 2n/n.
Proof. The process from the perspective of an arbitrary player i can be modelled as the following
Markov chain; the states are named after the number of remaining players including i, and state 〈×〉
is the state where i finds herself after successful transmission.
We write pyx to denote the transition probability to go from state 〈x〉 to state 〈y〉. We have
p×m =
(
1
2
)m−1
pm−1m = (m− 1)
(
1
2
)m−1
pmm = 1−m
(
1
2
)m−1
∀3 ≤ m ≤ n , and (5)
p×2 =
1
2
, p22 =
1
2
. (6)
The expected absorption time from state 〈n〉 to state 〈×〉 is found from the following set of
equations:
h×m = 1 + p
m
mh
×
m + p
m−1
m h
×
m−1, for all 3 ≤ m ≤ n,
and h×2 = 1 + p
2
2h
×
2 ,
where hyx denotes the expected hitting time from state 〈x〉 to state 〈y〉. By solving this system of
linear equations we get
h×n =
2n
n
, for n ≥ 2.
In the next theorem we will give an example of a method for checking whether a given protocol
profile is an equilibrium, which however could be inconclusive in some cases. Suppose you we want to
check whether an arbitrary protocol profile
#»
f is an equilibrium. By definition of the equilibrium, we
can fix all protocols except player i’s, i.e.
#»
f −i and check if fi is a best response to them, and repeat
this for every player i. By fixing
#»
f −i we create a stochastic environment for player i who can be
considered to be free to take sequential decisions through time. These decisions correspond to decision
rules of fi. Since, due to the feedback limitations, i has no information about the number of pending
players, this situation from her point of view is modeled as an infinite state Partially Observable
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Markov Decision Process (POMDP). fi is a best response to
#»
f −i if and only if fi is an optimal policy
of the POMDP, that is, a set of decisions through time that minimize her expected latency.
However for this kind of POMDPs there are no known techniques to find an optimal policy. In
order to circumvent this problem, we can assume that player i is an advantageous player that always
knows how many players are pending. This turns the infinite state POMDP into a finite state Markov
Decision Process (MDP), whose optimal policy we can find through known techniques (e.g. [21]).
One can see that the optimal policy in the MDP of the advantageous player i yields at most the
expected latency of the optimal policy in the POMDP of the initial player i. Thus, if the best policy
in the MDP yields the same expected latency as what
#»
f gives to i, then we know that fi is a best
response; however, if the best policy of the MDP yields smaller expected latency, then we get no
information about whether fi is a best response in the POMDP or not. The proof of the next theorem
demonstrates the method and shows that protocol f2 of (4) is an equilibrium protocol for 3 players.
Theorem 1. For 3 players and 2 channels, f2 is an equilibrium protocol with expected latency 8/3.
Proof. Consider the Markov Decision Process (MDP) (T, St, As,t, pt(j|s, a), rt(s, a)), where St is the
state space for time t; As,t is the set of possible actions that can be taken after observing state s at
time t; pt(j|s, a) defines the transition probability to state j ∈ St+1 at time t+ 1, and only depends on
the state s and chosen action a at time t; rt(s, a) is the cost function that determines the immediate
cost for the agent’s choice of action a while in state s. When the state s cannot be observed with
certainty at time t, the agent only knows a probability distribution, called belief state, over St. The
process then is called Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). An optimal policy
pi : S → A is a function that rules, for each state or belief state, which action to perform, with an
objective to minimize the expected cost.
For the proof of the above theorem we will use the following property of POMDPs. This property
comes directly from the fact that an agent optimizing over all policies that every time consider her
exact state gets a better policy than an agent that knows a probability distribution on the state space
(belief states).
Proposition 1. An optimal policy pi1 of an agent in a POMDP yields as expected cost at least the
expected cost of the optimal policy pi2 of the corresponding MDP, in which at any time t the agent
observes her exact state.
To prove Theorem 1 we think as follows. Let us fix protocol f2 as defined in (4) for two players,
and let the remaining player i have an arbitrary protocol gi. Then let us find the optimal policy for i.
If and only if the optimal policy yields expected cost strictly lower than what protocol f2 would yield
for player i (due to Lemma 3, that is 8/3), then f2 is not an equilibrium protocol. The game stated
at Theorem 1, from player i’s perspective, is modelled by a POMDP where each state is determined
by the number of pending players, with an additional absorbing state - where i goes after successfully
transmitting - and i’s transmission history for every t ≥ 1. Player i’s belief state at any time t is
determined by her belief state at time t− 1, the action she chose at time t− 1, and her observation
(e.g. her transmission history up to t− 1). This is a POMDP with infinite states, for which, to the
best of our knowledge, currently there are no methods in the literature for finding an optimal policy.
However, we will find the best policy and the expected cost of the corresponding MDP, where
player i knows in what state she finds herself after an action and observation. This expected cost is a
lower bound on the expected cost of the optimal policy of the original POMDP (see Proposition 1). In
the MDP we create, player i knows at any time t how many players are pending and her transmission
history up to time t.
Let p ∈ {1, 2, 3} indicate the number of pending players. Observe that the time steps at which the
process has a given p are consecutive; without loss of generality assume that for some p, the process
is in the discrete time interval [τp, τp−1 − 1], where we set τ3 = 1. Consider now the set Sp of all
states sp(
#»
h i,t) of the MDP, where the number of pending players p ∈ {1, 2, 3} is fixed, whereas the
transmission history
#»
h i,t for τp ≤ t < τp−1 can vary. Because of the protocol f being memoryless, the
same action (probability distribution over action space A) of i chosen at any state in Sp produces
the same transition probabilities. Therefore, choosing the optimal policy makes the set Sp of states
collapse to a single state sp, where p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The resulting MDP is a finite MDP with states
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s1, s2, s3 and s×, where the latter is an absorption state to which player i goes after a successful
transmission. Denote the expected cost of the MDP’s optimal policy given that the initial state is sp
by c(sp). In our problem the immediate cost for any combination of state and action is 1, since we
count the number of rounds in which i is pending. Using Lemma 5.4.2 and Theorem 5.4.3 of [21] we
can find c(s3) by solving the following system of linear equations
c(sp) = 1 +
∑
s′∈{s1,s2,s3}
Pr(sp to s
′| policy pi)c(s′). (7)
Then, by minimizing each c(sp) over policies pi we get the optimal expected costs C(sp), p ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
As a byproduct of the minimization we find the best policy pi∗.
In our problem, a policy pi is a tuple (q1, z1, q2, z2, q3, z3), where qp, p ∈ {1, 2, 3} determines the
probability that player i will attempt a transmission, and zp, p ∈ {1, 2, 3} determines the probability
that she will attempt the transmission on channel a = 1. To give a small example, for a given state sp,
(Pr(Xt = 0),Pr(Xt = 1),Pr(Xt = 2)) = (1− qp, qpzp, qp(1− zp)). By solving system (7), we get that
c(s1) =
1
q1
, c(s2) =
2 + 2q1 − 2q2
2q1 − q1q2 , c(s3) = 2 +
4− 2q2 − 2q2q3 + 2q1q2q3
4q1 − 2q1q2 + 2q1q3 − q1q2q3
which implies that a policy does not depend on any of the zp’s. Now, by minimizing the above expected
costs we get C(s1) = 1, C(s2) = 2 and C(s3) = 8/3 for q1 = 1 and q3 = 1. Note that the optimal
policy allows z1, z2, z3 and q2 to be arbitrary probabilities. q2 being even 0 is not a contradiction
since in our MDP the player is always aware of the pending players (state); in the case where q2 = 0,
when the player is in state s2, she waits one round until the other player transmits successfully and
then realizes that she is alone pending in s1; in the next round she transmits with probability 1.
We have shown that a best policy of an advantageous player gives her the same expected latency
as protocol f2 defined in (4) (the expected latency of f2 is given by Lemma 3). This, combined with
Proposition 1 completes the proof of Theorem 1.
We subsequently exploit the lack of memory and the anonymity of our protocol f2 defined in
equation (4) and show more general results on equilibria (Theorem 3), using the characterizations
from Subsection 3.1.
Theorem 2. In a contention game with k = 2 channels, consider an anonymous, memoryless protocol
of player i with the property: Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0, for every t ≥ 1. For more than 4 players any such
protocol is not an equilibrium protocol.
Proof. Assume that an anonymous protocol f as stated in the theorem is an equilibrium protocol for
n ≥ 5 players. We will show that condition (ii-b) of Lemma 2 does not hold. That is, if n ≥ 5 players
use a protocol f with the property that in each time its decision rule assigns zero probability to “no
transmission”, then there exists a best response that yields strictly better expected latency for an
arbitrary player.
Suppose f is an equilibrium protocol. f consists of a decision rule for each time slot t, i.e. a
probability distribution on the available channels (with probability 0 of “no transmission” as the
theorem’s statement requires). Since all players use this protocol, in an arbitrary time t all players have
the same distribution on the channels. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there is some t′ for which
the decision rule is other than
(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 12 , Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 12
)
. Without loss of generality, we
have Pr{Xi,t = 1} > Pr{Xi,t = 2}. Thus, an arbitrary player i, at time t, can unilaterally change her
distribution to (Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 0, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1) and increase her probability of transmitting
successfully in the specific round. As a consequence her expected latency would strictly decrease, hence
a protocol with a decision rule with different probabilities on each channel cannot be in a symmetric
equilibrium. Therefore, the anonymous, equilibrium protocol f , with the property Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0
for every t ≥ 1, prescribes (Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 12 , Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 12) for every t ≥ 1. The expected
latency of a player using such a protocol, when there are n pending players, is found in Lemma 3 to
be 2n/n.
10 G. Christodoulou, T. Melissourgos, and P. G. Spirakis
We will show that, when the number of pending players at t = 0 is n ≥ 5, protocol
gi ,
{
(Pr{Xi,1 = 1} = 0, Pr{Xi,1 = 2} = 0)(
Pr{Xi,t = 1} = 12 , Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 12
)
, for t ≥ 2,
is a better response for an arbitrary player i, that is, C
(f−i,gi)
i (
#»
h i,0) < C
f
i (
#»
h i,0) = 2
n/n.
Suppose player i uses protocol gi when there are n ≥ 5 pending players at t = 0. At time t = 2
she is not aware of the number of players that remain pending. However, there are two cases, either n
players are pending in case none of the other n− 1 players in t = 1 transmitted successfully, or n− 1
players remain in case only one of the other n − 1 players transmitted successfully in t = 1. Note
that there is no way that two players cannot simultaneously transmit successfully in round t = 2
due to the given protocol f and the number of pending players. The probability for each of the two
aforementioned events is,
Pn−1(x) =
n−1∑
r=x
(−1)r−x
(
r
x
)(
2
r
)(
n− 1
r
)
r!
(
1
2
)r (
1− r
2
)n−1−r
where x is the number of players that transmit successfully, 00 , 1, and
(
a
b
)
, 0 for a < b. To see how
this formula is produced, please refer to the proof of Lemma 7 (Section 5), up to equation (19). Here,
equation (19) is used for z = 1 and k = 2.
In order to capture the dependence of the expected future cost (after history ht−1) on the number
of pending players n, when player i uses gi and the rest of the players use f , we denote it by
F
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,t−1). Similarly, we denote the expected latency by C
(
#»
f −i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,t−1). We have,
C
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,0) = F
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,0) = 1 + Pn−1(0)F
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,1) + Pn−1(1)F
(f−i,gi)
i,n−1 (
#»
h i,1)
= 1 + Pn−1(0)
2n
n
+ Pn−1(1)
2n−1
n− 1 . (8)
For n ≥ 5, our formula in (19) gives Pn−1(0) = 1− (n− 1)
(
1
2
)n−2
and Pn−1(1) = (n− 1)
(
1
2
)n−2
.
Therefore (8) becomes
C
(f−i,gi)
i,n (
#»
h i,0) = 1 +
[
1− (n− 1)
(
1
2
)n−2]
2n
n
+ (n− 1)
(
1
2
)n−2
2n−1
n− 1
=
2n
n
+
4
n
− 1
<
2n
n
, for n > 4
= Cfi,n(
#»
h i,0).
Thus protocol gi yields strictly smaller expected latency than fi for player i when n ≥ 5, and this
means that f is not a symmetric equilibrium for n ≥ 5.
Since protocol f2 belongs to the class of protocols defined in the statement of Theorem 2, the
following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2. For n ≥ 5 players and k = 2 channels, f2 is not an equilibrium protocol. In fact, a
better response for any player is to not transmit in t = 1 and then follow f2.
Now we prove two lemmata that, combined with our second characterization of equilibria (Lemma
2), result to one of this section’s main theorems (Theorem 3) that determines equilibrium protocols
for n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels. In particular, we will show that for number of players
n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4, when n− 1 players use f , if some deviator unilaterally chooses any possible
protocol gi as defined in (1) that is consistent with
#»
f , she will suffer the same expected latency,
namely 2n/n. Then, we will show that if the deviator unilaterally chooses any possible protocol as
defined in (1) that is not consistent with
#»
f , she will suffer expected latency at least 2n/n. These two
facts, by Lemma 2, show that f is an equilibrium protocol for n ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
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Lemma 4. For n ≥ 2 players and k = 2 channels, any player i that follows a protocol gi ∈ Gf2 in
the profile (f2−i, gi), where f
2 is defined in (4), has expected latency 2n/n.
Proof. Consider the contention game with fixed number of players n ≥ 2 and 2 channels. n− 1 players
use protocol f2 and a player i ∈ [n] uses some protocol gi(hi,τ∗) ∈ Gf2 as defined in (1), for some
τ∗ ≥ 1. To make easier our reference to the expected future latency of a player in the special case
where (almost) all players follow protocol f2 of (4), and to capture the number of players in the
notation, we will denote by D(ri, n) , E[Ti| #»h i,0, ( #»f 2−i, ri)] and D(f2i , n) , E[Ti|
#»
h i,0,
# »
f2] the expected
future latency of player i when n players participate.
First we show that condition (ii-a) of Lemma 2 holds for every n ≥ 2. From Lemma 3 we know
that D(f2i , n) = 2
n/n, for every i ∈ [n]. Now observe that the set of all protocols gi(τ∗) as defined
in 1 that are consistent with f2i , consists of the protocols for which at 6= 0 for every 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ for
any τ∗ ≥ 1. That is, for all possible tuples (a1, a2, . . . , aτ∗) of a given τ∗, there is no t ≤ τ∗ for which
at = 0, and this is for all τ
∗ ≥ 1, since a history with “no transmission attempt” in it is not consistent
with f2. Given a tuple hi,τ∗ = (a1, a2, . . . , aτ∗), denote by xt the indicator variable that equals 1 if
player i chooses channel 1, and 0 if she chooses channel 2 in round t ≤ τ∗. Formally, a protocol as
described above is
gi = gi(hi,τ∗) ,
{
(Pr{Xi,t = 1} = xt, Pr{Xi,t = 2} = 1− xt) , for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
f2i,t , for t > τ
∗,
This process where a single player i uses some protocol gi and has a latency according to gi and the
other players’ fixed protocols, can be modelled as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) with infinite states; in this POMDP, each state is determined by the transmission history
of player i and the number of pending players including i, with an additional absorbing state where i
goes after successfully transmitting; player i’s belief state at any time t is determined by her belief
state at time t − 1, the action she chose at time t − 1, and her observation (e.g. her transmission
history up to t− 1).
The fact that we consider acknowledgement-based protocols together with the fact that the
partial protocol profile f2−i which produces our POMDP consists of memoryless and time-independent
protocols, make the states of our POMDP be independent of player i’s history. We now remark that,
regardless of the action taken in some belief state from player i playing gi, the transition probabilities
between belief states are independent of time. In particular, denote by 〈m, t〉 a state with m pending
players including player i at time t ≥ 1, and by 〈×〉 the unique absorption state where i finds herself
after successful transmission. We write pyx to denote the transition probability to go from state 〈x〉 to
state 〈y〉. It is easy to see that the transition probabilities among belief states with 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ are
p×m,t =
(
1
2
)m−1
pm−1,t+1m,t = (m− 1)
(
1
2
)m−1
pm,t+1m,t = 1−m
(
1
2
)m−1
∀3 ≤ m ≤ n, 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗,
and p×2,t =
1
2
, p2,t+12,t =
1
2
.
Observe that the above transition probabilities of any state for which 1 ≤ t ≤ τ∗ are identical
to those of equations (5) and (6) in the proof of Lemma 3; obviously for t > τ∗ the same holds
because player i has switched back to protocol f2. Since player i’s actions do not affect the transition
probabilities of the resulting belief states, the above POMDP reduces to a Markov chain that is in
fact identical to the one defined in the proof of Lemma 3, thus D(gi, n) = D(f
2
i , n) = 2
n/n.
The natural explanation for our POMDP resulting to the above Markov chain is that, if for
a given round all players have a given probability of transmission (not necessarily 1) uniformly
distributed on the channels and a single deviator picks an arbitrary distribution on the channels
for the same probability of transmission (in this case 1), then: (a) the probability with which she
transmits successfully remains unchanged because each channel is blocked with equal probability
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(1− 1/2n−1) by the rest of the players, and (b) the probabilities with which a specific number s of
players (excluding i) transmit successfully remain unchanged because, the probability of s players
successfully transmitting conditional on i choosing any of the channels is the same (due to the uniform
distributions on the channels by the rest of the players) regardless of the channel chosen by i.
Remark: The above arguments hold also in the case of any number k ≥ 1 of channels when an
anonymous, memoryless protocol f is used by all players except i, where f is defined by a probability
0 < z ≤ 1 that is split uniformly on the channels in every time-step (in our proof, k = 2 and z = 1 for
all t > 0). In such a case the POMDP is reduced to a corresponding Markov chain that is produced
when all players follow f .
Lemma 5. For 2 ≤ n ≤ 4 players and k = 2 channels, any player i that follows protocol ri /∈ Gf2 in
the profile (f2−i, ri), where f
2 is defined in (4), has expected latency at least 2n/n.
Proof. Consider the contention game with fixed number of players n ∈ {2, 3, 4} and 2 channels. n− 1
players use protocol f2 and a player i ∈ [n] uses some protocol ri = ri(hi,τ∗) /∈ Gf2 as defined in (1),
for some τ∗ ≥ 1. It is sufficient to show that the lemma holds, when ri is a best response to f2−i, where
ri is constrained to be inconsistent with (f
2
−i, f
2
i ). Therefore, among such best responses ri there has
to be one with a round t <∞ for which Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0 by definition of inconsistency. Let us focus
on the smallest such t which we will call from now on t0, i.e. t0 , inf{t : Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0}. Let us
now define the set of protocols ri(hi,t0) /∈ Gf
2
for the aforementioned t0. There are two categories of
such protocols: Category (1) has at0 6= 0, and Category (2) has at0 = 0. Each of those categories is
partitioned in two other categories: Category (I) has Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0 for every t > t0, and Category
(II) has Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0 for some t > t0. The categories are presented in Table 1 below.
Category 1 at0 6= 0
Category 2 at0 = 0
Category I ∀t > t0: Pr{Xi,t = 0} = 0
Category II ∃t > t0: Pr{Xi,t = 0} > 0
Table 1. The categories of protocol ri(hi,t0).
Right before time t0 there are n possible cases that could have occurred: m players are pending
including player i, for 1 ≤ m ≤ n. In each of those cases we want to find the expected future latency
of a player i that unilaterally uses protocol ri(hi,t0), given history
#»
h i,t0−1, and given that the pending
players right before time t0 are m; we will denote this by F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1). We will prove our claim
step by step, starting from protocols of Category (I) which are easier to analyze, and move on to
protocols of Category (II); we start the analysis from the case with the least possible players and
build up to the required number of players.
Starting with Category (1-I), the analysis of the proof of Lemma 4 implies that these protocols ri
yield the same expected latency as f2i in the tuple f
2, since their process’ Markov chain is identical
to this of the case (f2−i, f
2
i ). For Category (2-I), player i does not transmit at t0. Given that right
before t0 there are m pending players including i, at t0 either all m players remain pending, or
m − 1, or m − 2; the first event occurs when none of the m − 1 players using protocol f2 at t0
transmitted successfully, the second when only one of them did, and the third when two of them did.
The probability for each of those events is Pm−1(x), where x is the number of players that transmit
successfully, and can be found in (19) for k = 2 and z = 1. Therefore we have,
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pm−1(0)F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0) + Pm−1(1)F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,m−1 (
#»
h i,t0)
+ Pm−1(2)F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,m−2 (
#»
h i,t0)
= 1 + Pm−1(0)D(f2i ,m) + Pm−1(1)D(f
2
i ,m− 1) + Pm−1(2)D(f2i ,m− 2), (9)
where f ′i is the protocol followed by i for t > t0. For m = 1 it is P0(0) = 1, and P0(1) = P0(2) = 0.
For m = 2 it is P1(0) = P1(2) = 0, and P1(1) = 1. For m = 3 it is P2(0) = P2(2) =
1
2 , and P2(1) = 0.
For m = 4 it is P3(0) = 1− 3
(
1
2
)2
, P3(1) = 3
(
1
2
)2
, and P3(2) = 0.
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Now, using (9), we can see that for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 it is F (
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ F (
#»
f2−i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) =
D(f2i ,m) = 2
m/m. In particular,
for m = 1 : 2 ≥ 1,
for m = 2 : 2 ≥ 2,
for m = 3 :
17
6
≥ 8
3
, and
for m = 4 : 4 ≥ 4.
Equivalently, C
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f2−i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1), and therefore, due to (2), C
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,0) ≥
C
(
#»
f2−i,fi)
i,m (
#»
h i,0) for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4. Thus, for Category (I) and 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, condition (ii-b) of Lemma 2
holds.
For Category (1-II), we prove our claim for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 pending players right before t0. For m = 1,
obviously F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,1 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1, which is also the minimum possible when only one player is pending.
For m = 2, we have
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0)
Now, given that the protocol f2 used by all players apart from i is time-independent, it should be
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0). Because if
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) < F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0) or F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) > F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0), then f
′
i is not a best
response; in the former situation player i would prefer ri(hi,t0) over f
′
i ; in the latter situation she would
prefer a modified protocol ri(h
′
i,t0
) with Pr{Xi,t0 6= 0} = 0 over the current ri(hi,t0), respectively.
The probability of no player transmitting successfully in t0 is 1/2, thus we get F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) =
2 = F
(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = C
(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0−1).
For m = 3, we have
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0)
+ Pr{Exactly 1 player other than i transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,2 (
#»
h i,t0)
(10)
From the previous step, we know that a best response to f−i when there are 2 players pending
including i yields expected latency to i equal to 2. Also, the probability that exactly one player other
than i transmits successfully when there are 3 players pending, is 1/2. So, (10) gives
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 2 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0)
Again, given that the protocol f used by all players apart from i is time-independent, it should
be F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0) for the same reasons explained in the case of m = 2. The
probability of no player transmitting successfully in t0 is 1/2, thus we get F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 8/3 =
F
(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Finally, for m = 4, we have
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0)
+ Pr{Exactly 1 player other than i transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,3 (
#»
h i,t0)
(11)
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From the previous step, we know that a best response to f2−i when there are 3 players pending
including i yields expected latency to i at least 8/3. Also, the probability that exactly one player
other than i transmits successfully when there are 4 players pending, is 3/8. So, (11) gives
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 2 + Pr{No player transmits successfully}F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0)
Again, given that the protocol f2 used by all players apart from i is time-independent, it
should be F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = F
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0) for the same reasons explained for m ∈ {2, 3}. The
probability of no player transmitting successfully in t0 is 1/2, thus we get F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 4 =
F
(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,4 (
#»
h i,t0−1). Thus, for Category (1-II)
and 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, condition (ii-b) of Lemma 2 holds.
Now we proceed with the proof of the statement for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 for the final category, namely
Category (2-II), using the results from Category (1-II). For every m ≥ 1, equation (8) holds. For
m = 1, we have
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,1 (
#»
h i,t0−1) = 1 + 1 · F (
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i,1 (
#»
h i,t0) ≥ 2,
where the above inequality comes from the fact that the minimum expected future latency for m = 1
is 1 (found in Category (1-II)). By applying the same methodology for 2 ≤ m ≤ 4 we have
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ 3 +
[
1− (m− 1)
(
1
2
)m−2]
2m
m
≥ 2
m
m
= F
(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i,m (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Then, by taking into account our lower bounds for F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i (
#»
h i,t) when 0 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 and for all
possible numbers m of remaining players (including i), we get
F
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ F (
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i (
#»
h i,t0−1), which implies C
(
#»
f2−i,ri)
i (
#»
h i,t0−1) ≥ C(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i (
#»
h i,t0−1).
Then, from Corollary 1 and equation (2) it is C
(
#»
f2−i,f ′i)
i (
#»
h i,0) ≥ C(
#»
f2−i,f2i )
i (
#»
h i,0) and this completes
the proof.
Theorem 3. For n ∈ {2, 3, 4} players and k = 2 channels, f2 is an equilibrium protocol with expected
latencies 2, 8/3 and 4, respectively.
Proof. By combining Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and the equilibrium characterization of Lemma 2.
n players - 3 transmission channels. Here, by employing our characterizations from Subsection
3.1, we give an acknowledgement-based, equilibrium protocol for n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} players and k = 3
channels.
Theorem 4. For n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} players and k = 3 channels, f3 defined in (4) is an equilibrium
protocol with expected latencies 3/2, 15/8, 189/80 and 597/200, respectively.
We omit the proof because the proof idea is the same as that of Theorem 3. However, the analysis
here is done for each value of n separately, since we do not have a closed form (similar to that of
Lemma 3) for the expected latency of n players using protocol f3 for 3 channels. This is because,
although using standard Markov chain techniques a linear recurrence relation of the expected latency
is easily found, this recurrence relation has non-constant coefficients, for which - to our knowledge -
there are no techniques in the literature to solve them3.
3 We note that reducing the recurrence relation to one with constant coefficients using already existing
techniques did not work.
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4 Equilibria for Ternary Feedback Protocols
In this section we consider anonymous protocols with ternary feedback, that is, a pending player
knows at every time t the number m ≤ n of pending players. This knowledge is given to each player
regardless of her transmission history.
4.1 Nash equilibrium characterization
Here we give a characterization of FIN-EQ protocols for n ≥ 1 players and k = 2 channels in the
general history-dependent case for ternary feedback.
Theorem 5. There exists an anonymous, history-dependent, equilibrium protocol with ternary feed-
back for n players and 2 transmission channels.
Proof. Suppose n ≥ 2 players use the same protocol f in a system with 2 available transmission
channels. At time t, the decision rule of a player with history ht−1 among m pending players is
described by the probabilities with which she will transmit on channel 1 and channel 2, i.e. pi,1m,t
and pi,2m,t respectively. These transmission probabilities, in general, depend on the history ht of the
respective player, however t is used instead as a subscript in order to make the notation lighter.
Also, suppose that the anonymous protocol f is an equilibrium and also that pi,1m,t 6= pi,2m,t. Without
loss of generality pi,1m,t > p
i,2
m,t. Then a player could unilaterally deviate at round t and choose to
transmit on channel 2 with probability 1, thus maximizing her probability of success. Therefore, in
an anonymous, equilibrium protocol, for every history ht−1 and every number m ≥ 2 of pending
players, each player assigns equal transmission probabilities to the channels. Hence we drop the
channel indicator superscript - along with the player indicator superscript - and write pm,t. Note that
pm,t ∈ [0, 12 ].
We will slightly abuse the notation here and write Cm(ht) and Fm(ht) for the expected cost of a
player (e.g. Alice) and the expected future cost of a player respectively, at time t ≥ 0, given history
ht, where there are 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players. Note that, since the protocol is symmetric, we have
replaced the subscript that indicates the player’s identity with the one that indicates the number of
pending players, and we also have omitted the superscript f .
We have4
Cm(ht) = P
×
m · (t+ 1) + Pm−1m · Cm−1(ht+1) + Pm−2m · Cm−2(ht+1) + Pmm · Cm(ht+1)
or equivalently, Fm(ht) = 1 + P
m−1
m · Fm−1(ht+1) + Pm−2m · Fm−2(ht+1) + Pmm · Fm(ht+1),
where for m ≥ 2: P×m =Pr{Alice transmits successfully}
=2pm,t(1− pm,t)m−1,
Pm−1m =Pr{Exactly 1 player other than Alice transmits successfully}
=2(m− 1)pm,t
[
(1− pm,t)m−1 − (m− 1)pm,t(1− 2pm,t)m−2
]
,
Pm−2m =Pr{Exactly 2 players other than Alice transmit successfully}
=(m− 1)(m− 2)p2m,t(1− 2pm,t)m−2,
Pmm =Pr{No player transmits successfully} = 1− P×m − Pm−1m − Pm−2m .
For m = 1 the pending player has probability of no transmission equal to zero, therefore F1(ht) = 1
for every history ht.
Now, given that m ≥ 2 players are pending, the equilibrium protocol cannot assign to them
probability pm,t = 0 at any time t. That is because a unilateral deviator that surely transmitted to a
channel would be successful and therefore she would acquire strictly smaller latency than any other
player. Since transmission to both channels is in the support of the decision rule of a player at time t,
4 The probabilities are correct by defining 00 = 1.
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both sure transmission attempt to some channel and no transmission should yield the same expected
latency to a player. In the sequel we will use the expected future latency Fm(ht) for our analysis.
The expected future latency of Alice when she surely transmits on an arbitrary channel in round t
with m ≥ 2 pending players (including herself) is
Fm(ht) = 1 +Q
m−1
m · Fm−1(ht+1) + (1−Q×m −Qm−1m ) · Fm(ht+1), (12)
where for m ≥ 3: Q×m =Pr{Alice transmits successfully}
=(1− pm,t)m−1,
Qm−1m =Pr{Exactly 1 player other than Alice transmits successfully}
=(m− 1)pm,t
[
(1− pm,t)m−2 − (1− 2pm,t)m−2
]
,
Qmm =Pr{No player transmits successfully} = 1−Q×m −Qm−1m ,
for m = 2: Q×2 =1− pm,t, Q12 = 0, Q22 = pm,t. (13)
The expected future latency of Alice when she surely does not attempt transmission in round t
with m ≥ 2 pending players (including herself) is
Fm(ht) = 1 + S
m−1
m · Fm−1(ht+1) + Sm−2m · Fm−2(ht+1) + (1− Sm−1m − Sm−2m ) · Fm(ht+1), (14)
where for m ≥ 3: Sm−1m =Pr{Exactly 1 player other than Alice transmits successfully}
=2(m− 1)pm,t
[
(1− pm,t)m−2 − (m− 2)pm,t(1− 2pm,t)m−3
]
,
Sm−2m =Pr{Exactly 2 players other than Alice transmit successfully}
=(m− 1)(m− 2)p2m,t(1− 2pm,t)m−3,
Smm =Pr{No player transmits successfully} = 1− Sm−1m − Sm−2m ,
for m = 2: S12 =2pm,t, S
0
2 = 0, S
2
2 = 1− 2pm,t. (15)
By equating the right-hand sides of (12) and (14) we get the probability pm,t as a function of
expected future costs Fm−1(ht+1), Fm−2(ht+1) and Fm(ht+1).
The equilibrium probability that depends on the number of pending players m and defines the
equilibrium protocol, although guaranteed to exist when expected (future) latencies are finite, is
difficult to be expressed in closed form. Contrary to the case of a single channel studied in [11], where
pm,t can be nicely expressed as a function of Fm−1(ht+1) and Fm(ht+1) in closed form, this does not
seem to be the case in the current setting.
We should mention here that in the single-channel setting studied in [11] the decision rule pm,t = 1
for m ≥ 3 is in equilibrium. However, in the case of two channels, a similar result (e.g. pm,t = 1/2) for
any number of pending players does not seem to hold. Indeed, in time t with m ≥ 5 pending players
playing pm,t = 1/2, the best response with strictly better expected latency is pm,t = 0.
4.2 History-independent FIN-EQ protocols
Let us now consider anonymous, history-independent protocols, that is, protocols whose decision
rules depend only on the number 1 ≤ m ≤ n of pending players. Now, the decision rule pm of the
players does not depend on their transmission history (and therefore on time as well), hence a player’s
expected future latency Fm does not depend on her transmission history. In this class of protocols
the following theorem fully characterizes the equilibria.
Theorem 6. There exists a unique, anonymous, history-independent, equilibrium protocol with
ternary feedback for n players and 2 transmission channels, which is: any player among 2 ≤ m ≤ n
remaining players, for every t ≥ 1 attempts transmission to each channel with equal probability pm.
This probability is Θ( 1√
m
) and yields expected future latency eΘ(
√
m) for every player.
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Proof. By manipulating the equilibrium conditions (12) and (14) we find
Fm =
[
Qm−2m−1S
m−1
m + S
m−2
m (1−Qm−1m−1)
]−Qm−1m (Qm−2m−1 − Sm−2m )
(1−Qmm)
[
Qm−2m−1S
m−1
m + S
m−2
m (1−Qm−1m−1)
]−Qm−2m−1Qm−1m (1− Smm) . (16)
From this we can also get Fm−1, thus, replacing these two in relation (12), which, in the history-
independent case becomes
(1−Qmm)Fm = 1 +Qm−1m Fm−1, (17)
we get the recurrence relation for the transmission probability pm to each channel. The resulting
recurrence relation of pm is non-linear with non-constant coefficients and for its form there is no
methodology in the literature that solves it - to the authors’ knowledge. However, we can find the
asymptotic behaviour of pm in the following way.
First, we show by induction that pm is uniquely determined. The recurrence relation of pm holds for
m ≥ 2 since our probabilities Q and S are defined for this domain only. That is because probabilities
Q and S stem from the requirement that “transmission” and “no transmission” are both in the
support of the decision rule for a player, which is not true in the case of m = 1. As a base case of our
induction we use m = 2, for which we find from (12) and (14) as unique solution the pair (p2 = 1/2,
F2 = 2). Now consider some m ≥ 2 and assume that all pm′ are uniquely determined for every m′,
2 ≤ m′ ≤ m, and thus all Fm′ are uniquely determined by (16). Let us replace m with m+ 1 in (17),
and fix pm and Fm with the known ones. This gives us a rational univariate function - let us call it h
- of pm+1, i.e. h(pm+1) = (1−Qm+1m+1)Fm+1 − 1−Qmm+1Fm. We would like to find the roots of h in
the interval (0, 1/2]. By substituting Qm+1m+1, Q
m
m+1 and Fm from (13) and (16) respectively, and then
examining the first and second derivative of h, we can see that h(0) = 0, h has its unique minimum for
some p′m+1 ∈ (0, 1/2), and it is strictly decreasing in [0, p′m+1]. In [p′m+1, 1/2] it is strictly increasing
and h(1/2) ≥ 0. Therefore, in (0, 1/2] there is a unique root p∗m+1 of h.
Now we proceed in showing that the asymptotic behaviour in both sides of the recurrence relation
(17) is the same for pm ∈ Θ(1/
√
m). First, we express the probabilities Q and S (see sets of equations
(13) and (15)) in terms of Q×m, and then we put pm,t = pm ∈ Θ(1/
√
m). This gives:
Q×m ∈ e−Θ(
√
m), Qm−1m = Q
×
m · f1(m), Qm−2m = 0, Qmm = 1−Q×m · f2(m), and
S×m = 0, S
m−1
m = Q
×
m · g1(m), Sm−2m =
(
Q×m
)2 · g2(m), Smm = 1−Q×m · g3(m),
where the functions f1(m), f2(m), g1(m), g3(m) are in Θ(
√
m) and g2(m) is in Θ(m). Now that we
have described the asymptotic behaviour of the probabilities Q and S, we can find the asymptotic
behaviour of the expected future latency Fm using (16). By carefully simplifying the numerator and
denominator in the right-hand side of (16) we get
Fm =
1
Q×m · h1(m)
, where h1(m) ∈ Θ(
√
m).
Recall that Q×m ∈ e−Θ(
√
m), thus Fm ∈ eΘ(
√
m). The above formula for Fm also implies that Fm−1 =
1/
(
Q×m−1 · h2(m)
)
, where h2(m) ∈ Θ(
√
m). By substituting Fm and Fm−1 in the recurrence relation
(17), we show that the asymptotic behaviour in both sides of it are the same, in particular, Θ(1). This
completes the proof.
The latter result is analogous to the one in [11] that characterizes anonymous, history-independent,
equilibrium protocols with ternary feedback for the case of a single channel. However here, the proof
methodology is different due to the fact that there is no known technique to express the equilibrium
transmission probabilities in closed form, therefore their asymptotic behaviour can only be extracted
from a recurrence relation, which, contrary to the one in [11], is quite complex. Using dynamic
programming, we can compute the equilibrium probabilities in linear time; for up to m = 100 the
equilibrium probabilities are presented in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Blue: the equilibrium probabilities pm for 2 ≤ m ≤ 100. Red: experimental upper bound, function
2√
m−1 . Black: experimental lower bound, function
1
2
√
m−1 .
5 IN-EQ Protocols for Both Feedback Classes
Ideally, we would like to find an anonymous, equilibrium protocol that is efficient (i.e. the time until
all players transmit successfully is Θ(n/k) with high probability) and also has finite expected latency.
For the case of ternary feedback and a single channel such a protocol was found in [11]. That protocol
set a deadline t0 ∝ n after which it prescribed to the players to transmit with probability 1 on the
channel at every time. It is easy to see that transmitting surely at every time is an equilibrium for
more than 2 players. The idea of that protocol was to employ that “bad equilibrium” by putting it
after the deadline so as to keep the players that were unsuccessful until t0 for a very long (exponential
in n) time. This works as a threat to the players, which they try to avoid by adopting a cooperative
behaviour; using a history-dependent, equilibrium protocol they attempt transmission with probability
low enough so that all of them are successful before the deadline with high probability. After the long
part of the protocol, there is a last part that prescribes to the players to use a history-independent,
equilibrium protocol (similar to the one we find for the 2-channel case) which has finite expected future
latency. Since all three parts of the protocol are in equilibrium, the whole protocol is in equilibrium
as well.
However, for the case of multiple channels in both the ternary feedback and acknowledgement-based
feedback classes, a protocol with the above structure cannot be constructed as the following theorem
shows. First, let us define the following notion of equilibrium protocol: By equilibrium with blocking
step (EBS) we call an anonymous, equilibrium protocol with the property that there exists a time-step
(<∞) of the protocol in which every pending player has probability of successful transmission equal
to 0.
Theorem 7. In the classes of acknowledgement-based and ternary feedback protocols with k ≥ 2
channels and n ≥ 2 players, there exists no equilibrium protocol with blocking step (EBS) and finite
expected latency.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction, that f is an anonymous equilibrium protocol with finite
expected latency and it has a blocking step. Suppose all n players follow f , therefore the protocol
profile is
#»
f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) = (f, f, . . . , f). Also, suppose that the blocking step is at t = t0, which
means that in any combination of personal histories
#»
h t0 = (h1,t0 , h2,t0 , . . . , hm,t0) of the m ≤ n
pending players which happens with positive probability under
#»
f , no player transmits successfully.
Additionally, since f is an equilibrium protocol, at t0 the probability that some channel is “free” is 0,
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because if not, a player could deviate unilaterally at t0 by choosing that channel with some positive
probability, and thus improve her expected latency.
Consider the set H that contains all combinations of personal histories
#»
h t0−1 = (h1,t0−1, h2,t0−1, . . . , hm,t0−1). Consider also the subset H> of H that contains all combina-
tions that happen with positive probability, and the subset H0 = H \H> containing those that happen
with probability 0. For the reasons explained above, any combination
#»
h ′t0−1 ∈ H> is characterized by
the property that the combination of decision rules of the m pending players at t0 that it produces
necessarily has at least 2 players assigning probability 1 on each channel (so that every channel
is surely blocked and no player can deviate unilaterally). Any combination
#»
h ′t0−1 that does not
have this property must be in H0, otherwise a player that under f would assign probability 1 on a
surely blocked channel at t0, she could unilaterally deviate by assigning at t0 an appropriate positive
probability on a channel that is “free” with positive probability, and decreasing her expected latency.
Now pick an arbitrary element
#»
h ′t0−1 of H>, and without loss of generality, suppose that players
1, 2, . . . , 2k block all k channels with probability 1 at t0. That is
f1(h1,t0−1) = (Pr{X1,t0 = 1} = 1, Pr{X1,t0 6= 1} = 0) , (18)
f2(h2,t0−1) = (Pr{X2,t0 = 1} = 1, Pr{X2,t0 6= 1} = 0) ,
f3(h3,t0−1) = (Pr{X3,t0 = 2} = 1, Pr{X3,t0 6= 2} = 0) ,
f4(h4,t0−1) = (Pr{X4,t0 = 2} = 1, Pr{X4,t0 6= 2} = 0) ,
...
f2k−1(h2k−1,t0−1) = (Pr{X2k−1,t0 = k} = 1, Pr{X2k−1,t0 6= k} = 0) ,
f2k(h2k,t0−1) = (Pr{X2k,t0 = k} = 1, Pr{X2k,t0 6= k} = 0) .
Consider now that the event
#»
h ∗t0−1 where all players have the same history h1,t0−1 right before
t0, and observe that happens with positive probability, because the game starts with all players
having the exact same history, i.e. the empty history, and can continue having the same history by
transmitting to the exact same channels for every t ≤ t0 − 1 since they will be prescribed identical
decision rules by protocol f . Therefore
#»
h ∗t0−1 ∈ H>. In such an event, all players, just like player
1 in (18) above, will transmit with probability 1 on channel 1 at t0. Therefore the remaining k − 1
channels will be “free” at t0, therefore
#»
h ∗t0−1 ∈ H0 which is a contradiction.
In the above analysis, the arguments about a player being able to unilaterally deviate and decrease
her expected latency, need the extra property that the expected latency of the player is finite. Because
if the expected latency is infinite, unilateral deviation does not make it finite, therefore she has no
incentive to deviate. The proof is complete.
This impossibility result discourages the search for anonymous, efficient, multiple-channel, equilib-
rium protocols with the additional property of finite expected latency, since the only candidate that
guarantees efficiency seems to be a deadline protocol. Whether no anonymous, efficient, equilibrium
protocol with finite expected latency can be found for multiple channels is one of the most interesting
open problems that stem from this work.
In the rest of this section we present IN-EQ protocols within the classes of acknowledgement-based
and ternary feedback for the general case of k ≥ 1 channels and any number of n ≥ 2k + 1 players.
For this, we employ the deadline idea introduced in [11] and consequently used in [7,8]. Our protocols
are efficient, even though the expected latency is infinite.
5.1 Acknowledgemnt-based feedback
In the aforementioned companion short paper [10] we provided an efficient deadline protocol with
infinite expected latency for k ≥ 1 channels and n ≥ 2k + 1 players. This protocol generalizes the
efficient protocol of [7] which deals with a single channel and at least 3 players. The general protocol
we present uses their idea, that is, estimating the number of pending players (since it is not known in
the acknowledgement-based environment) and adjusting the transmission probabilities of the players
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accordingly, in order to simulate a socially optimal protocol (see protocol SOP below) that allows all
transmission to be successful by time Θ(n/k) with high probability. Our modification is that, instead
of prescribing to the players to always transmit to the single channel once they reach the deadline (so
that with some positive probability they get blocked forever), we block all channels with positive
probability by prescribing a random assignment of each player to a channel.
In particular, consider k ≥ 1 transmission channels, n ≥ 2k + 1 players, a fixed constant β ∈ (0, 1)
and a deadline t0 to be determined consequently. The t0 − 1 time steps are partitioned into r + 1
consecutive intervals I1, I2, . . . , Ir+1 where r is the unique integer in
[− logβ n/2− 1,− logβ n/2]. For
any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r+1} define nj = βjn/k. For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} the length of interval Ij is lj = b eβnjc.
Interval Ir+1 is special and has length lr+1 = n/k. We define the following anonymous protocol.
Protocol g1:
Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players for t ∈ Ij assigns transmission probability
1/max{nj , k} to each channel. Right before the deadline t0 = 1 +
∑r+1
j=1 lj each pending
player is assigned to a random channel equiprobably, and for t ≥ t0 always attempts
transmission to that channel.
Lemma 6. Protocol g1 for n ≥ 2k + 1 players and k ≥ 1 channels, is an equilibrium protocol and it
is also efficient.
Proof. First we prove that g1 is an equilibrium protocol when n ≥ 2k + 1. Consider an arbitrary
player i, and observe that since all players play g1 the probability that all of them will be still pending
by t0 is 1/n
t0 > 0. Given that, the probability that player i at t0 will be assigned to the same channel
with at least 2 other players is at least the probability that she will be assigned to the same channel
with all other players, which is at least 1/kn > 0. Hence, the probability that player i can find herself
in t = t0 pending together with two other players is positive, and in this case she will remain pending
forever. Therefore, i’s expected latency is ∞, and since by any unilateral deviation of i she cannot
make the aforementioned event empty, her expected latency will always be ∞. Therefore, g1 is an
equilibrium protocol.
Now we proceed by showing that g1 is also efficient, that is, all players transmit successfully by
time t0 = 1 +
∑r+1
j=1 lj ∈ Θ(n/k). The proof of efficiency is essentially the same as that of Theorem
11 in [7] and it is omitted. The difference here is that we have tuned nj and lr+1 according to our
problem and we have used variable r instead of k. As a consequence, this result is the same as that of
the aforementioned theorem in [7], except that ours has n/k instead of n.
5.2 Ternary feedback
In the ternary feedback setting, the use of the unique history-independent equilibrium (see Subsection
4.2) yields exponential expected latency in the number of players n, and additionally, even one player’s
latency being any polynomial in n happens with exponentially small probability. This fact points
to history-dependent protocols as candidates for efficient equilibria. Here, we construct a protocol
(Theorem 8) which imposes a heavy cost on any player that does not manage to transmit successfully
until a certain deadline-round. This forces any potential deviator to play “fairly” until the deadline
and follow an anonymous, socially optimal protocol, named SOP (guarantees expected time Θ(n/k)
for all players to pass).
To prove the main theorem of this subsection we need a series of technical results. As a first step,
we give the general Lemma 7 that determines the expected number of successful transmissions in a
round where m players have a uniform distribution on the channels, and subsequently in Fact 1 we
find the maximum of that expected number. Then, we present another lemma (Lemma 8) that gives
an upper bound on the expected finishing time when m ≤ k. Finally, using all the aforementioned
intermediate results, we present a socially optimal protocol in Lemma 9 which is employed in the
proof for our main theorem (Theorem 8) that concerns our IN-EQ protocol.
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Lemma 7. Consider a single round with k ≥ 1 channels and n ≥ 1 players. Assume that for every
player the probability of transmission attempt is z ∈ [0, 1] which she splits equally to all k channels.
Then, the expected number5 of players that transmit successfully is zn
(
1− zk
)n−1
.
Proof. For a fixed z ∈ [0, 1], denote by Xn the random variable that indicates how many players
transmit successfully in a round with n players. Note that when z = 1 and n ≥ 2, the case where
Xn = n− 1 is impossible since in order for some player to have a failed transmission she has to be
blocked by someone else.
Our problem reduces to the following balls-and-bins problem: Consider n balls and k bins, where
n ≥ 1. Each ball is thrown with probability z/k to each bin, and not thrown at all with probability
1− z. Random variable Xn ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} now indicates the number of bins that had a single ball
after the experiment.
We want to find E[Xn]. For this, we will employ the probability of the event that x bins contain a
single ball given that the round started with n balls. Denote by Aj the event that bin j contains a
single ball. Also, we define the probabilities of intersections between such events
pj = Pr(Aj), pjm = Pr(Aj ∩Am), pjml = Pr(Aj ∩Am ∩Al), . . .
and we write Sr to denote the sums of all distinct p’s with r subscripts. That is
S1 =
k∑
j=1
pj , S2 =
∑
j<m
pjm, S3 =
∑
j<m<l
pjml, . . .
where the subscripts are in increasing order j < m < l < · · · < k for uniqueness, so that in the sums
each combination appears only once; therefore Sr has
(
k
r
)
terms. In our setting, each term of Sr equals
(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
since for specific r bins to contain a single ball there are
(
n
r
)
combinations of r balls, which should
occupy the r bins with r! orders. Each of those chosen r balls can fall in a bin with probability zk and
each of the rest n− r balls has to fall in some other than those r bins or not be thrown at all, which
happens with probability 1− rzk . So,
Sr =
(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
and by the Inclusion-Exclusion Theorem, the probability that exactly x bins contain a single ball is
the following6
Pn(x) =
n∑
r=x
(−1)r−x
(
r
x
)
Sr
=
n∑
r=x
(−1)r−x
(
r
x
)(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
(19)
5 We define 00 = 1.
6 For the case where a < b we define
(
a
b
)
, 0 so that the analysis is displayed only once for both cases n ≤ k
and n > k.
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We want to calculate E[Xn]. We have
E[Xn] =
n∑
x=0
xPn(x)
=
n∑
x=0
n∑
r=x
(−1)r−xx
(
r
x
)(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
=
n∑
r=0
r∑
x=0
(−1)r−xx
(
r
x
)(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
=
n∑
r=0
(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r r∑
x=0
(−1)r−xx
(
r
x
)
=
n∑
r=0
(
k
r
)(
n
r
)
r!
( z
k
)r (
1− rz
k
)n−r
(−1)r
r∑
x=0
(−1)xx
(
r
x
)
=
(
k
1
)(
n
1
)
z
k
(
1− z
k
)n−1
(−1)(−1) (since
r∑
x=0
(−1)xx
(
r
x
)
= −1 for r = 1, 0 otherwise)
= zn
(
1− z
k
)n−1
.
The following fact shows where the expected number of players of the above theorem is maximized
as a function of z (the probability mass devoted to transmission).
Fact 1. Consider the function f(z) = zn(1− z/k)n−1, with domain [0, 1] and parameters k ≥ 1, and
n ≥ 1. The maximum of f is attained for z = min{k/n, 1}.
Proof. The first and second derivatives of f are
f ′(n) = n
(
1− zn
k
)(
1− z
k
)n−2
f ′′(n) = n(n− 1)
(
1− z
k
)n−3 nz − 2k
k2
When n < k, then f ′(z) > 0 and therefore the global maximum of f is attained for z = 1, which gives
f(1) = n(1− 1/k)n−1.
When n ≥ k, the first derivative of f is 0 for (a) z = k when n ≥ 3, or (b) z = k/n when n ≥ 1.
Case (a) only works if k = 1 due to the domain of z and gives f(1) = 0. f ′(z) is positive in [0, k/n),
and negative in (k/n, 1). Therefore, f(k/n) = k(1− 1/n)n−1 is the global maximum.
Lemma 8. Suppose there are k ≥ 2 channels and 2 ≤ n ≤ k players and suppose that all players
use the following protocol: A player in every time step t ≥ 1 has a probability of transmission 1/k
to every channel. Then, the expected time until everyone transmits successfully is upper bounded by
1
1−ln(e−1) ln(
n
2 ) +
(
1− 1k
)−1
.
Proof. Denote by Xm the random variable that indicates how many players transmit successfully in
a round t where m ∈ {0, 2, . . . , n} players are left. Note that the case where m = 1 is impossible since
in order for some player to have a failed transmission she has to be blocked by someone else. In the
next round the expected number of players will be m− E[Xm]. We define the finishing time as the
following random variable T , inf{t : m = 0} and we would like to find its expectation.
Our problem reduces to the following balls and bins problem: Consider n balls and k bins, where
2 ≤ n ≤ k. At time t = 1 all balls are thrown uniformly at random to the k bins. For all the bins that
contain a single ball, these balls are removed, and in the next round m ∈ {0, 2, . . . , n} balls remain.
At time t = 2 all m balls are thrown uniformly at random to the k bins. The process continues as
long as there are remaining balls. Random variable Xm ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m} now indicates the number
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of bins that had a single ball when the respective round started with m balls. Note again that
Pr(Xm = m− 1)= 0 since there is no allocation of balls in the bins such that m− 1 bins have a single
ball. Random variable T , inf{t : m = 0} is the finishing time of this process.
We define the function f(m) to be the expected finishing time E[T ] when m players remain. We
assume that this function is non-decreasing and concave. Then we have,
f(m) = 1 +
m∑
i=0
Pr(Xm = i)f(m−Xm)
= 1 + E[f(m−Xm)]
≤ 1 + f (E[m−Xm]) (concavity of f and Jensen’s inequality)
= 1 + f(m− E[Xm]) (linearity of expectation) (20)
Now by exploiting the monotonicity of the function f(m) in equation (20), and using Lemma 7 we
only need to find a lower bound on E[Xm]. This is easy, since m
(
1− 1k
)m−1 ≥ m (1− 1k)k−1 ≥ m/e.
Then from equation (20) we get
f(m) ≤ 1 + f
(
m
(
1− 1
e
))
≤ r + f
(
m
(
1− 1
e
)r)
.
We use as base case f(2) for which holds that f(2) = 1 + k 1k2 f(2), or equivalently, f(2) = (1− 1/k)−1.
Then the r for which m
(
1− 1e
)r
= 2 finally gives us
f(m) ≤ 1
1− ln(e− 1) ln(
m
2
) +
(
1− 1
k
)−1
Let us define the following anonymous, history-independent protocol which we prove to be efficient.
However, we remark that it is not in equilibrium, due to Theorem 6 which characterizes the unique,
anonymous, equilibrium protocol that is history-independent.
Protocol SOP:
Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players, in each round t ≥ 1 assigns transmission
probability 1/max{m, k} to each channel.
In the sequel, by e we denote the constant named “Euler’s number”, i.e. e = 2.7182 . . . .
Lemma 9. Protocol SOP for k ≥ 1 channels and n > k players has expected finishing time O((n−
k)/k).
Proof. Suppose protocol SOP as stated in the theorem is used. Then, the transmission probability of
each player in each round is uniform on the set of channels K. Using the framework of Lemma 7,
according to protocol SOP for variable z we have z = min{k/m, 1}, and we know from Fact 1 that
this value maximizes the number of successful transmissions in a round with m players. Denote by
Xm the random variable that keeps track of the number of successful transmissions in a single round
with m > k pending players. Then, according to Lemma 7, in a round with m > k pending players it
is E[Xm] = k(1− 1/m)m−1.
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Define the function f(m) to be the expected finishing time when there are m > k pending players.
We assume that this function is non-decreasing and concave. Then we have
f(m) = 1 +
m∑
i=0
Pr(Xm = i)f(m−Xm)
= 1 + E[f(m−Xm)]
≤ 1 + f (E[m−Xm]) (concavity of f and Jensen’s inequality)
= 1 + f(m− E[Xm]) (linearity of expectation) (21)
Now by exploiting the monotonicity of the function f(m) in equation (21), and using Lemma 7
we only need to find a lower bound on E[Xm]. This is easy, since k
(
1− 1m
)m−1 ≥ k/e. Then from
equation (21) we get
f(m) ≤ 1 + f
(
m− k
e
)
≤ r + f
(
m− r k
e
)
.
We use as base case f(k) for which holds that f(k) ≤ 11−ln(e−1) ln(k2 ) +
(
1− 1k
)−1
, due to Lemma 8.
Then the r for which m− r ke = k finally gives us
f(m) ≤ em− k
k
+
1
1− ln(e− 1) ln(
k
2
) +
(
1− 1
k
)−1
.
Using the above lemmata we are able to prove the following.
Lemma 10. (a) If at t = 0 there are n pending players, the probability that more than k players are
pending at time t1 = 2e(n− k)/k is at most exp
(−n−k2ek ).
(b) If at t = 0 there are k pending players, the probability that not all players have transmitted
successfully at time t2 = 2e(n− k)/k is at most exp
(−n−k2ek ).
Proof. Let {Yt}t1t=1 be random variables which indicate the number of successful transmissions that
occur in each time-step from t = 1 up to t1 , 2e(n− k)/k, given that there are n pending players
at time t = 0. For the events for which Y ,
∑t1
t=1 Yt > n− k we have the desired outcome. For the
rest, since the pending players in each round 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 are m > k, the protocol prescribes to each
player probability 1/m on each channel. Therefore, by Lemma 7, we have E[Yt] = k (1− 1/m)m−1. In
the next claim we show that Yt stochastically dominates a random variable Zt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} that
indicates the number of successful transmissions in round 1 ≤ t ≤ t1 but, in this process, the players
that transmit successfully are placed back to the group of pending players.
Claim. Pr{Yt ≥ x} ≥ Pr{Zt ≥ x}, for all x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}.
Proof. We will prove the above claim by showing the stronger fact that, for any fixed number
1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 of pending players at time t,
Pr{Yt ≥ x | m pending players} ≥ Pr{Yt ≥ x | m+ 1 pending players},
for all x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k}.
Indeed, by substituting the probabilities of the above inequality we get,(
m
x
)
x!
(
1
m
)x (
1− x
m
)m−x
≥
(
m+ 1
x
)
x!
(
1
m+ 1
)x(
1− x
m+ 1
)m+1−x
,
or equivalently, (m+ 1)m(m− x)m−x ≥ mm(m− x+ 1)m−x,
and finally,
(
1 +
1
m
)m
≥
(
1 +
1
m− x
)m−x
,
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which is true, since the function f(w) = (1 + 1/w)
w
is strictly increasing. The claim follows from the
fact that for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k},
Pr{Zt ≥ x} = Pr{Yt ≥ x | n pending players}.
Clearly {Zt}t1t=1 are independent random variables bounded in [0, k]. Let Z ,
∑t1
t=1 Zt and
µ1 , E[Z] =
∑t1
t=1 E[Zt] = t1k (1− 1/n)n−1. Then by Hoeffding’s inequality [15] and the stochastic
domination we have,
Pr(Y ≤ n− k) ≤ Pr(Z ≤ n− k) = Pr
(
Z ≤ µ1
2e (1− 1/n)n−1
)
≤ Pr
(
Z ≤ µ1
2
)
≤ exp
(
− (1− 1/2)
2µ21
t1(k − 0)2
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
t1
e2
)
= exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
,
where in the last three inequalities we used the fact that (1− 1/n)n−1 ≥ 1/e.
For the second part of the proof, suppose the process is at round t = 0 with k pending players.
Let {Xt}t2t=1 be random variables which indicate the number of successful transmissions that occur in
each time-step from t = 1 up to t2 , 2e(n − k)/k, given that there are k pending players at time
t = 0. The pending players in each round 1 ≤ t ≤ t2 are m ≤ k, hence the protocol prescribes to
each player probability 1/k on each channel. By Lemma 7, we have E[Xt] = m (1− 1/k)m−1. Now,
observe that Xt stochastically dominates a random variable Wt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} that indicates the
number of successful transmissions in round 1 ≤ t ≤ t2 but, in this process, the players that transmit
successfully are placed back to the group of pending players. The latter observation is easy to see
since an argument similar to the Claim that was stated earlier holds in this case.
Clearly, {Wt}t2t=1 are independent random variables bounded in [0, k]. Let W ,
∑t2
t=1Wt and
µ2 , E[W ] =
∑t2
t=1 E[Wt] = t2k (1− 1/k)k−1. Then by Hoeffding’s inequality [15] and the stochastic
domination we have,
Pr(X ≤ k − 1) ≤ Pr(W ≤ k) = Pr
(
W ≤ µ2k
2e(n− k) (1− 1/k)k−1
)
≤ Pr
(
W ≤ µ2
2
)
≤ exp
(
− (1− 1/2)
2µ22
t2(k − 0)2
)
≤ exp
(
−1
4
t2
e2
)
= exp
(
−n− k
2ek
)
,
where in the last three inequalities we used the fact that (1− 1/k)k−1 ≥ 1/e, and n ≥ 2k + 1. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
We define the following anonymous protocol. In the next theorem we show that it is an equilibrium
protocol and also that it is efficient.
Protocol r:
Let the deadline be t0 = 4e(n− k)/k. Every player among 1 ≤ m ≤ n pending players for
1 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 assigns transmission probability 1/max{m, k} to each channel. Right before
t0 each pending player is assigned to a random channel equiprobably, and for t ≥ t0 always
attempts transmission to that channel.
Theorem 8. Protocol r for n ≥ 2k + 1 players and k ≥ 1 channels is an efficient, equilibrium
protocol.
Proof. First, we show that it is an equilibrium protocol when n ≥ 2k + 1. The expected latency of a
player using protocol r is ∞. That is because there is an event with positive probability in which
some player i finds herself in an equilibrium where at least 2 of the other players have been assigned
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to each and all of the k channels and transmit there in every time slot. In particular, with probability
at least k( 1n )
t0−1 > 0 all players will be pending right after t0 − 1. Given this, with probability(
n−1
2,2,...,2,n−1−2k
)
( 1k )
n−1 > 0 exactly 2 out of n−1 players will be assigned to each of the k−1 channels
and the remaining players (including player i), which are at least 3, are assigned to the remaining
channel. Therefore, the aforementioned two events occur with positive probability, and then for player
i all channels are blocked for every t ≥ t0, resulting to infinite latency. Hence, the expected latency of
a player using protocol r is ∞.
Now suppose that player i unilaterally deviates to some protocol r′. The event that all players
are pending right before t0 remains non-empty, since the event that all players transmit on the same
channel as i for every 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 − 1 happens with positive probability. Given that, the event that at
least 2 of the players other than i will be assigned to each channel happens with positive probability.
Therefore, the deviator’s expected latency remains ∞ and r is an equilibrium protocol.
Finally, we will show that, when n ∈ ω(k), this protocol is also efficient, i.e. the time until all n
players transmit successfully is linear in n/k with probability tending to 1 as nk →∞. By Lemma 10,
the probability that not all players have successfully transmitted by time t1 + t2 = 4e(n− k)/k is
at most exp
(−n−k2ek )+ exp (−n−k2ek ) = 2exp (−n−k2ek ) . Therefore, when n ∈ ω(k), no player is pending
after 4e(n− k)/k rounds with high probability.
6 Open Problems
This work leaves open some interesting problems. One of them is to find equilibria for arbitrary
number of players in the multiple-channel setting with acknowledgement-based feedback. This will
probably require a characterization of equilibria such as the one we provide for ternary feedback
protocols in Subsection 4.1.
Another important open problem is to prove or disprove that there exists a FIN-EQ protocol that is
efficient in the multiple-channels setting. This could be a deadline protocol or it might use some other
key idea to impose a heavy latency on the players as a threat, so that they auto-restrain themselves
from frequently attempting transmission. Proving that there is no efficient deadline FIN-EQ for the
multiple-channel setting would be an interesting “paradox”, since an efficient deadline FIN-EQ is
found in [11] for the single-channel setting with ternary feedback. In view of Theorem 7 we conjecture
that the “paradox” is there.
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